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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Natu re of the Case
In his Appel/ant's Brief, Mr. Day argued that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him
due process and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment the record on
appeal with the transcript of his June 16, 2008, sentencing hearing.

Mr. Day argues

that the requested transcript is necessary for his appeal because the district court could
utilize its own memory of the prior proceedings when it decided to revoke Mr. Day's
probation. In response, the State argues that the requested transcript cannot be added
to the appel/ate record because it did not exist prior to the probation violation disposition
hearing and, therefore, the district court did not consider the information discussed at
Mr.

Day's original sentencing

hearing when

it made its probation/sentencing

determinations. The State also argues that the requested transcripts are not relevant to
the issues on appeal because Mr. Day cannot prove that the district court relied on the
information discussed at the hearing in question when it made its probation/sentencing
determinations.
This brief is necessary to address the State's characterization of the requested
transcript as new evidence.

Mr. Day argues that the requested transcript is not new

evidence because a district court can rely on its own memory of the prior proceedings
when it considers whether to revoke probation or reduce a sentence.

Since Idaho

appel/ate courts conduct an independent review of the record when determining
whether a district court abused its discretion in regard to a probation/sentencing
determination, what the district court actually considered is irrelevant.
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The only

questions are:

whether the information at issue was before the district court, and

whether that information is relevant to the probation/sentencing issues on appeal.
Mr. Day also argued that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked
probation because that decision was based on the court's erroneous conclusion that it
would have continued jurisdiction over this case and would be able to modify the order
revoking probation in the event Mr. Day's conviction in another matter was overturned
on appeal.

In response, the State argued that the district court's decision to revoke

probation was based solely on the conviction in the other matter and the court's
misperception of law had no bearing on its decision to revoke probation. This brief is
necessary to clarify that the district court's misperception of law was central to its
decision to revoke probation.
Mr. Day also argued that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to
sua sponte reduce the length of Mr. Day's probation upon revoking his probation. The

State argued that Mr. Day stipulated to his sentence during the plea negotiations and,
therefore, the doctrine of invited error precludes him from challenging the length of his
sentence on appeal. This brief is necessary to clarify that the doctrine of invited error is
not applicable because Mr. Day is appealing from an order revoking probation, not the
original judgment of conviction and, thus, is appealing from an entirely new sentencing
decision made by the district court.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Day's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Day due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcript?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Day's probation?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr. Day's
sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Day Due Process And Equal Protection When It
Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested Transcript

A.

Introduction
In Idaho, district courts consider a broad range of information when making

sentencing decisions.

Due to this broad range of information considered, Idaho

appellate courts have scrupulously required defendants to provide an extensive
appellate record because they conduct an independent review of the entire record
before the district court when determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred in
regard to a sentencing/probation determination. In other words, the question on appeal
generally does not focus on how or what the district court actually considered. Instead,
the central question is whether the record before the district court supports its
sentencing/probation determination.
Since Idaho appellate courts need to have all of the relevant information that was
before the district court to conduct this analysis, they will presume that any missing
information supports the trial court's determination and refuse to rule on the merits of
the issue.

In some instances, appeals have been dismissed due to the appellants'

failure to provide transcripts of hearings which occurred years before the disposition of
the issue on appeal and were never discussed by the district court.
In this case, Mr. Day argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due
process and equal protection when it denied his request for the transcript of his original
sentencing hearing, which is necessary to provide an adequate record for appeal. In
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response, the State argues that the requested transcripts are not necessary because
the district court did not have those transcripts when it made the sentencing/probation
determinations at issue. The State goes as far as arguing that the requested transcripts
would constitute new information on appeal, which cannot be considered by an
appel/ate court. The State's position, if taken to its logical conclusion, would limit the
information a district court could consider because a transcript of a prior hearing would
have to be created before a district court could consider information from that hearing in
regard to a subsequent proceeding. For example, without a transcript of a defendant's
original sentencing hearing, a district court could not consider information from that
sentencing hearing when determining whether to grant or deny an Idaho Criminal Rule
35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion.

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Day Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested
Transcript
An indigent defendant can require the State to pay for an appellate record

including verbatim transcripts of the relevant trial proceedings. However, the State does
not necessarily have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request.

In

order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the
State must provide indigent defendants with a sufficient appellate record to enable a
merit-based review of the issues raised on appeal.

In this case, the Idaho Supreme

Court denied Mr. Day's request for the transcript of his original sentencing hearing held
on June 16, 2008. That denial prevents Mr. Day from adequately addressing the issues
raised on appeal. Further, it could be presumed that the information contained in the
missing transcript supports the district court's probation/sentencing determinations.

5

In response to this position, the State argues that the requested transcripts were
never presented to the district court and were, therefore, never part of the record before
the district court and are not properly considered for the first time on appeal.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) Contrary to the State's position, the question of whether
the transcript of the requested proceeding was before the district court at the time of the
probation violation disposition hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the transcript
is relevant to the issues on appeal.

That is because, in reaching a sentencing or

probation decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information
offered at the proceeding from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to
utilize knowledge gained from its own official position and observations.

Downing v.

State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900,
907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in
part, upon what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977)
(recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal
transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the
quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984)
(approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected
to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether
the prior hearing was transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the district court could
rely upon the information it already knew from presiding over Mr. Day's sentencing
hearing when it made its probation/sentencing determinations.
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Additionally, the State's position is unworkable because all transcripts, except a
transcript of the hearing from which an appeal is taken, would be deemed new
information. This is inconsistent with the holding from State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271,
276 (Ct. App. 2000), where the district court examined the defendant about his guilty
plea during the change of plea hearing. Since the defendant in Burdett failed to provide
a transcript of that hearing on appeal, the Court of Appeals presumed that something
occurred in that hearing which supported the district court's sentencing decision. Id.
If the State's argument is taken to its logical conclusion, a transcript of a
defendant's original sentencing hearing would be new information in instances where an
appeal is filed from an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion requesting
leniency.

Further, if that is new information, a district court should not, absent a

transcript, consider what happened at sentencing when evaluating a Rule 35 motion.
However, in State v. Wright, 114 Idaho 451, 452-453 (Ct. App. 1988), the Idaho Court of
Appeals refused to address the merits of an appeal from the denial of an

Rule 35

motion because the appellant failed to provide the Presentence Investigation Report
(hereinafter, PSI) and a transcript of the sentencing hearing in the appellate record.
See also State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936 (Ct. App. 1984).

The State's argument is also refuted by State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 20
(Ct. App.1992).

In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery and

placed on probation.

Id. at 21.

Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked and the

district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days.

Id.

After completing the period of

retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on probation. Id. Mr. Warren's probation
was then revoked. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that his sentence was
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excessive. Id. On appeal, Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial. Id.
The Court of Appeals addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the
nature of the probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must
look at the nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where
Warren bit off his victim's ear." 1d. 1 (emphasis added). However, the Court of Appeals
did not address the merits of his sentencing claims because he failed to provide a copy
of the original PSI and a transcript of the original sentencing hearing. Id. Even though
the district court's original sentence was not directly being appealed, and happened
years before the decision at issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcript
was necessary to address Mr. Warren's claims of error.

Moreover, there was no

indication that the district court referenced the original sentencing hearing at the
probation violation disposition hearing. It appears that the Court of Appeals assumed
that the original sentencing hearing would address the nature of the original offense. In
light of the Court of Appeals' holding in Warren, had Mr. Day failed to request the
transcript, the State could have argued that his appeal should have been dismissed for
failure to provide an adequate appellate record.

2

This is an example of the Idaho Court of Appeals conducting an independent review of
the record, which is detached from the district court's sentencing rationale.
2 The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, Docket
No 39057, 2012 Opinion No. 38 (Ct. App. 2012) (not yet final), which addressed the
foregoing argument. In Morgan, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review
articulated in State v. Hanington 148 Idaho 26 (Ct. App. 2009). Specifically it held:
1

In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
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According to the State, Mr. Day argued, "with no citation whatsoever," due
process and equal protection require the State to provide him (and all indigent
defendants) with an appellate record unless some or all of the requested materials are
unnecessary or frivolous.

(Respondent's Brief, p.8.)

As an initial point, the State's

characterization of Mr. Day's position is misleading because it omits the fact that
Mr. Day recognized that a colorable need for the requested transcript must exist before
it becomes the State's burden to prove the requested transcript is irrelevant.

See

Appellant's Brief, p.5 ("In the event the record reflects a colorable need for a transcript,
the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant from obtaining
that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to the issues
raised on appeal.").
Mr. Day's burden shifting argument was based on Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404
U.S. 189, 195 (1971), where the United States Supreme Court first held that the State
does not need to "waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate
appellate review." However, the Court went on to hold that:
We emphasize, however, that the State must provide a full verbatim
record where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an
appeal as would be available to the defendant with resources to pay his
own way. Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make
out a colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State
to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice
for an effective appeal on those grounds. This rationale underlies our
statement in Draper.3 that:

record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Morgan, at 4 (original emphasis). However, the Morgan opinion is not a final opinion
and Mr. Day is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal.
3 Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 498 (1963).
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'(T)he State could have endeavored to show that a narrative
statement or only a portion of the transcript would be adequate and
available for appellate consideration of petitioners' contentions. The
trial judge would have complied with * * * the constitutional mandate
* * * in limiting the grant accordingly on the basis of such a showing
by the State.'4

Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). If it is apparent on the record that there is a
colorable need for the requested transcripts, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested transcripts are irrelevant.

Further, the Mayer Court never stated it is the

defendant's burden to prove a colorable need for the requested transcript. Instead, it
held that if the grounds for appeal make out a colorable need for the transcript then the
burden shifts to the State. Therefore, Mr. Day's burden shifting position is supported by
the case law referenced by the State.
Based on the Mayer opinion, the State also argues that Mr. Day has failed to
make the requisite showing that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues on
appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-12.) Specifically, the State cites to the Mayer opinion
for the proposition "that, absent a showing that evidence was presented at prior
hearings, and that the district court relied on such evidence in reaching its decision to
revoke probation, an appellant is not entitled to a transcription at public expense, . , ."

4 While addressing the State's argument the Mayer Court also noted that:
[This analysis does not include a] balance between the needs of the
accused and the interests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition
against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would
be available to others able to pay their own way. The invidiousness of the
discrimination that exists when criminal procedures are made available
only to those who can pay is not erased by any differences in the
sentences that may be imposed. The State's fiscal interest is, therefore,
irrelevant.
Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196-197.
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(Respondent's Brief, p.6 (original emphasis).) The State then argues that Mr. Day has
failed to show that the district court relied on anything that occurred during the hearing
at issue when the district court revoked her probation.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-8.)

The State's position is flawed because it assumes that it is Mr. Day's burden to
establish the relevance of the transcript, a proposition, which is not support by the
Mayer opinion.
The State's position is also flawed because it eng rafts its definition of relevance
into the holding from Mayer and then confuses the applicable standard or review. First,

Mayer only requires that the State provide an indigent defendant access to transcripts if
they are generally relevant to an issue on appeal. That opinion does not attempt to
define relevance. It never holds, as the state suggests that a transcript is relevant only
if evidence was adduced at a hearing or if the district court relied on the hearing at issue
when revoking probation.
More importantly, the State's position disregards the applicable standard of
review. When a sentencing/probation determination is at issue on appeal, the appellate
court conducts its own independent review of the record, which is not confined to the
information considered by the district court.

State v. Flores, 131 Idaho 285, 286

(Ct. App. 1998) ("Where an appellant asserts that the sentencing court imposed an
excessively harsh sentence, we conduct an independent review of the record and focus
upon the nature of the offense and the character of the offender."); see also State v.

Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is

5 The State also cites to State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457 (2002). (Respondent's Brief,
p.11.) Mr. Day does not contest the holding in Strand which limits indigent defendants,
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ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record
encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our review upon
the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between
the original sentencing and the revocation of probation.,,)6 (emphasis added); State v.
Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 (Ct. App. 1983) ("An abuse of discretion is shown if the

sentence is unreasonable considering all the facts of the case.") (emphasis added). In
determining whether information is relevant to an appellate court during this review the
only question is whether the information was before the district court, 7 not whether the
district court actually relied on that information. This is plenary review.

Therefore, the

State's assertion that Mr. Day must prove that the district court relied on information
which was either discussed or presented at the hearings in question is misplaced
because it disregards the applicable standard of review.
Additionally, Mr. Day's position about the applicable standard of review was
firmly established prior to Hannington in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053 (Ct. App.
1989). In that case, the defendant, Mr. Adams, did not appeal from his judgment of
conviction and challenges the length of his sentence on an appeal from an order
revoking probation. Id. at 154-155. The State argued as follows:
[I]f a sentence is pronounced but suspended, and no appeal is taken
immediately from that judgment, the defendant has waived any claim that
the sentence is excessive. Accordingly, the argument goes, when an
appeal is later taken from an order revoking probation and directing the

access to transcripts of Rue 35 hearings to those instances where testimonial evidence
was presented at the hearing.
6 The Hanington opinion was directly addressed by the Court of Appeals in Morgan,
supra.
7 The information must also relate to a sentencing concern such the nature of the
offense or the defendant's background.
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sentence to be executed, our scope of review is limited to facts and events
after the sentence was originally pronounced. It takes little imagination to
see that such a cramped scope of review would be a recipe for virtually
automatic affirmance in most cases.
Id. at 1055.

The Court of Appeals employed the following analysis in rejecting the

State's argument:
Accordingly, we take this opportunity to make it clear that when we
review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has been
revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before and
after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two reasons.
First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution of the
original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially segregate
the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The judge
naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events and
considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing that
decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a sentence is
suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant reason, and
no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked, and the
sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an excessive
sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the state's
position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the
appellate system cluttered with such cases.
Therefore, we apply a comprehensive scope of review to the case
at hand.
Id. at 1055-1056. As such, when an appellate files an appeal from an order revoking

probation the applicable stand of review requires an independent and comprehensive
inquiry to the events which occurred prior to as well as the events which occurred during
the probation revocation proceedings. The basis for this standard of review is that the
judge "naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events and
considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision."

Id.

The Court of Appeals then

stated that, "When reviewing that decision, we should consider the same facts."
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Id.

The Court of Appeals did not state that the district court must expressly reference the
prejudgment events at the probation disposition hearing in order for this standard of
review to become applicable. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals assumed the judge
will automatically consider the prejudgment events when determining whether probation
should be revoked. As such, Mr. Day need not prove that the district court expressly
relied on the events which occurred at his original sentencing hearing in order for the
transcript of that hearing to be relevant to the sentencing issues which is currently on
appeal.
Further, the State's position will render appellate review on various sentencing
issues meaningless because district courts in Idaho are not required to state their
sentencing rationale. State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 665,666 (1984). If the State's argument
is accepted, an appellate court would not be able to review a sentence/probation
determination in the event a district court does not state its sentencing rationale on the
record because an appellate court reviewing that sentencing decision would not know
what information the district court considered. The State's position is at odds with a
system which purports to provide meaningful sentencing review.
In sum, Idaho courts consider a very broad range of information when making
sentencing decisions.
provide

an

extensive

Due to that broad range of information, an appellant must
appellate

record

in

order

to

challenge

all

forms

of

sentencing/probation determinations on appeal because Idaho appellate courts will
presume any missing information will support the district court's decision. It generally
does not matter what the district court actually considered, if the information was in the
record and is relevant to an issue on appeal, an appellate court will independently
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review that information.

In light of the foregoing, the Idaho Supreme Court denied

Mr. Day due process and equal protection when it denied him a transcript of his original
sentencing hearing which he will need to overcome this presumption.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Day's Probation
Mr. Day argued in his Appellant's Brief that the district court abused its discretion
when it revoked probation because that decision was based on the assumption that it
would have continuing jurisdiction to place Mr. Day on probation in the event Mr. Day's
Bingham County conviction, which is currently on appeal, is eventually overturned. The
reason the district court thought the conviction in Bingham County might be overturned
is that the psychosexual evaluation in that matter concluded that Mr. Day was probably
innocent.

In response, the State argued that the district court based its decision to

revoke probation "solely on the fact that [Mr. Day] was recently convicted" in Bingham
County. (Respondent's Brief, p.15.)
Contrary to the State's position, the district court's decision to revoke probation
was based, at least in part, on its erroneous assumption that it would have continuing
jurisdiction over this matter. The district court's statements are as follows:
All Right. Well, you raised an interesting question. In view of the
psychosexual evaluation, I guess I can understand why there's an appeal
going on in Bingham County. But having said that, I don't - I don't know
that I can discount - I'm really not in a position to discount that conviction.
I have to take that conviction at face value.
And based upon that conviction, that probation violation, obviously
a very serious conviction, a very serious crime charged and then the
conviction. So based upon that, I am revoking probation on this. Certainly
if the conviction gets overturned, that's grounds for me to reconsider the
revocation of probation; but as it stands right now with the Bingham
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County conviction and also the sentence in Bingham County, I don't think
it makes sense for me to do anything other than revoke probation under
the circumstances. So that's where I'm at.
(08/29/11 Tr., p.2, L.19 - p.3, L.11.) The district court's decision to revoke probation
encompassed its assumption that it would have continued jurisdiction over this matter in
the event the Bingham County conviction was overturned because there is no break in
the district court's analysis. The district court discussed the existence of the Bingham
County conviction and then, in the same paragraph, continued its sentencing rationale
based on its mistake of law. The district court's analysis is not bifurcated, it is all part of
the same decision calculus. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion because it
did not revoke probation in accordance with the applicable legal standards governing
that decision.8
In the event this Court rejects Mr. Day's argument, he argues in the alternative,
that the district court abused its discretion because it concluded that it had no discretion
to disregard the Bingham County conviction. According to the district court, it was "not
in a position to discount that conviction. I have to take that conviction at face value."
(08/29/11 Tr., p.2, Ls.22-25.) The district court abused its discretion because it did not
recognize that it did not have to take the Bingham County conviction at face value. In
fact, it had the discretion to consider the psychosexual evaluator's indictment of the
Bingham County conviction and conclude that the conviction did not warrant the
revocation of probation.

As such, the district court abused its discretion because it did

8 The State never argued that the district court was correct when it stated it could modify
the order revoking probation in the event the Bingham County conviction was
overturned. The State's silence as to this issue functions as an implicit concession to
Mr. Day's argument.
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not recognize that it had the discretion to consider the mitigating nature of the
psychosexual evaluation and disregard the Bingham County conviction while making
the determination of whether the revocation of probation was warranted.
In sum, the district court abused its discretion because it made its decision in
contravention of the applicable legal standards.

Specifically, its decision to revoke

probation was based on it erroneous conclusion that it would have unending jurisdiction
over this matter.

The district court also abused its discretion because it failed to

recognize that it had the ability to disregard the Bingham County conviction based on
the psychosexual evaluation, which seriously questioned the validity of Mr. Day's
conviction.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Mr. Day's Sentence
Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Day argued that the district court erred when it failed
to sua sponte reduce the length of his sentence upon its decision to revoke probation.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.19-22.) In response, the State argues that Mr. Day "stipulated to
receiving an even greater determinate sentence than he received and is therefore
precluded by the invited error doctrine from challenging the sentence on appeal."
(Respondent's Brief, pp.18-19.) Contrary to the State assertion, the doctrine of invited
error is not applicable in this matter because Mr. Day is appealing from an order
revoking probation, not the original judgment of conviction and, therefore, is appealing
from an entirely new sentencing decision made by the district court.
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Mr. Day's position is supported by State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941 (2003). In that
case, Mr. Jensen was sentenced and placed on probation, but did not appeal from the
judgment of conviction. Id. at 944. On an appeal from a subsequent order revoking
probation, Mr. Jensen challenged his sentence as being unconstitutional based on a
double jeopardy claim. Id. at 943-944. The Court of Appeals refused to address the
constitutional issue.

Id.

at 943-944.

In doing so, the Court drew the following

distinctions between an appeal from an original judgment and an order revoking
probation:
The present circumstance must be distinguished from one in which
only the length of a sentence is challenged on appeal from an order
revoking probation. The Idaho appellate courts have jurisdiction, on
appeal from an order revoking probation, to entertain a claim that a
sentence is excessive. This is so because, by terms of Idaho Criminal
Rule 35, whenever a trial court revokes probation it has authority to sua
sponte reduce the sentence that was originally pronounced. It is
consequently permissible for appellants to present as an issue whether
the trial court abused its discretion in failing to reduce a sentence upon
the revocation of probation. That type of appeal is a challenge to a new
decision (explicit or implicit) made by the district court upon revocation of
probation. Accordingly, we have made it clear in such appeals that an
appellate court will not consider whether the sentence was excessive
when originally pronounced in the judgment of conviction and that our
review is limited to whether the sentence was excessive in light of the
circumstances existing when the court revoked probation. 9
In contrast to a claim that a trial court abused its discretion on
revoking probation by ordering an excessive sentence into execution,
Jensen's claim that his sentences violate constitutional double jeopardy
prohibitions does not implicate a new decision or exercise of discretion by

9 The Court of Appeals was careful to footnote the applicable standard of review in
these instances, which is consistent with and provides further support for the arguments
set forth in Section I, supra. "When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence on an
appeal from a probation revocation order, we do not base our review only upon events
that occurred after the original pronouncement of sentence. Rather, we examine the
entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment, including but
not limited to events that occurred during the probationary period." Id. at 944 n.1.
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the trial court upon revocation of probation; it is a challenge to the original
imposition of sentence and judgment.
Id. at 944 (underlined emphasis added) (italicized emphasis in original).

In this case,

Mr. Day appealed from an order revoking probation. As such, his excessive sentence
claim is not a challenge to his original sentence.

It is, in fact, a challenge to a new

decision by the district court when it revoked probation.

Therefore, his presentence

plea agreement does not bar him from arguing that the district court failed to sua sponte
reduce the length of his sentence. Had Mr. Day appealed from judgment of conviction
and raised an excessive sentence claim the State's invited error argument would be
appropriate. However, those are not the facts of this case. Moreover, there is nothing
in the record indicating that Mr. Day's sentencing stipulation controls in the event his
probation was subsequently revoked.
In sum, Mr. Day appealed from an order revoking probation, not the original
judgment of conviction. It follows that he is appealing from an entirely new sentencing
decision and he never stipulated that the length of his sentence in the event probation
was revoking. Therefore, the doctrine of invited error is not applicable in this matter.
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CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Day respectfully
requests that this Court remand this matter with instruction for the district court to place
Mr. Day on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Day respectfully requests that the district court
reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence.
DATED this 30 th day of October, 2012.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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